L. Michael Hall, Ph.D.

In his two books on Six Blind Elephants, Steve Andreas announces that it is all about scope and category. He says that it is about how we create categories in our mind to understand things as well as how we bite off various sizes of information to deal with— how big or small the scope of our focus. So far, so good, but then he uses these distinctions to mostly rephrase NLP. What we call sensory awareness of the VAK, he calls “scope.” Then for the higher level frames, the logical levels, and the meta-states, he calls them “category.”

What does that mean? It means that when you read Six Blind Elephants, you are reading about logical levels or meta-states and the meta-stating process. Yet the author does not acknowledge this nor does he seem to be even very much aware of it. Yet it is the meta-stating process that is presented over and over in the books.

Now a meta-state is a higher logical level phenomenon created by how we step back from whatever we are experiencing at the primary state level of sensory-based experience (scope) and rise up, transcend the immediate, and then include the immediate inside of a higher frame, context, or category. So when Andreas deals with “categories” of the mind, he is referring to the same subjective experience that I do when I speak about meta-states even if he has yet to acknowledge such. While this is obvious over and over in the book, you would never know it from reading these books.

Meta-Stating Problems
Steve writes:

“When solving a problem it makes a huge difference whether we think of wrestling with it or dancing with it, attacking it or thinking of it as challenging. Categorizing [e.g., meta-stating] it one way can make any process difficult, unpleasant, and arduous, while another description can make it an exciting adventure.” (Volume II, p. 84)

Here “categorizing,” puts the primary state of “solving a problem” into one of these four categories. This is the very same process when we meta-state the problem-solving state with one of these four mental-emotional states. Andreas speaks as if this is some new thing in NLP when actually it has been a part of the NLP Meta-States Model since 1994 when it was recognized by the International Association of NLP Trainers. What Andreas seems to not know is that when you meta-state, you set up a new category.

Meta-Stating using Cognitive Qualifiers
Andreas speaks of John McWhirter as having provided —

“. . . a fascinating and subtle example of how our minds can be pre-set to respond in a particular way, that sadly, others have not previously noticed. A ‘cognitive qualifier’ is a ‘commentary’ adverb appearing at the beginning of a sentence or phrase that refers to an emotional or cognitive state, such as the words ‘happily’ or ‘sadly’ in the previous sentence.” (Vol. II, p. 84, italics added)

Did Andreas just say that a cognitive qualifier “refers to an emotional … state?” That’s amazing! Yet that is as close as he will admit that categorizing is the same as meta-stating. The cognitive qualifiers are at a higher level and “refer to an emotional state.” And that is how I have defined a meta-state. Though Andreas has sadly not noticed it before (years and years of Anchor Point and NLP World articles about Meta-States) this is precisely part of the description of a meta-state—a higher state about a lower state.

“Cognitive qualifiers direct your mind to think of an experience in a way that is specified by the kind of qualifier used.” (II, p. 85)

That sounds like what I wrote years ago in an article on Texturing States describing how we qualify a state via the meta-stating process. Noting that the words “sadly, luckily, and happily” refer to “emotional states, and most emotions are evaluative” he also writes.

“An attitude of interest or fascination is an excellent positive resource state for learning and change, because it redirects attention from the evaluation of the problem to interest and curiosity about how the problem works, a shift to a more specific logical level of categorization. (II, p. 86)

If Andreas had done his homework in studying the Meta-States Model, he would have known that we define a meta-state as an “attitude” and that, as such, it sets an evaluative frame at a higher level and redirects our focus. Content wise, I think we are saying the same thing although we are using different words and drawing different conclusions.

In his fourth chapter Modes of Operating (Volume II), he uses Venn diagrams to illustrate how one of the motivation or option modal operator states relate to another, sometimes embedding one inside of the other. He has Impossibility as the largest level, then Possibility and inside of Possibility there is Necessity, Choice, and Desire states. When we do this in Meta-States, we talk about one state embedded inside of another. I began doing that in 1996.

Andreas even begins playing with state upon state, having to choose, choosing to need, etc.

“When you are totally congruent, it is possible to, you want to, you choose to, and paradoxically, you also have to, because you really couldn’t do anything else!” (II, p. 108)

His fifth chapter, Self-Reference deals with Circularity.

“Self-reference inevitably occurs whenever we think about ourselves and how our minds work.” (II, p. 111)

Ah, here we again have a meta-state. When we say something about ourselves, the thoughts we generated are “both made by the self and describe the self, so they refer to themselves, in a circular process.”

“Whenever the criteria for a higher logical level are the same as the criteria for the members of the included logical levels, it will be self-referential.” (II, p. 114)
“In order for a statement to be self-referential, it has to either:
a. refer to itself directly, or
b. refer to itself indirectly, by including itself as a member of a more general category that it describes, and
c. the description must apply to all members of the category.
To discover self-reference, the key question to ask is, ‘Is this communication an example of what the communication describes?’” (II, p. 116)

Now Andreas writes as if this is a brand new discovery. Actually, it was— back in 1994—12 years earlier! In fact, in 1995 I put together a book on negative meta-states (“dragons”) like worrying about worrying (anxiety) and I described the looping and downward spiraling when one brings a negative state against oneself.

“In worrying, the process may continue to occupy your mind for some time, as you recursively think of one possible scenario after another. However, if you find yourself in an unsatisfactory loop, and the results of the future event are very important to you, you may find that the loop escalates at every step, creating what has often been called a ‘vicious circle’ of increasing anxiety.” (II, p. 125)

From the first edition of Meta-States (1995), I described paradoxes as a result of meta-stating. When you deliberately do what you typically experience as a spontaneous symptom you have a counter-intuitive way to interrupt the escalating loop which usually results in reducing the symptoms. Why is this? Because, as Andreas notes, it reverses the direction of the escalating loop (II, p. 127).

“By deliberately creating fear, you can find out exactly how you do it—what kind of images you make, what you say to yourself, etc. — and this can transform what you previously experienced as involuntary into something voluntary.” (II, p. 128)

In Meta-States, I also noted the meta-state structure in Virginia Satir’s question, “How do you feel about feeling depressed?” I quoted this in the book, showed how that this is a meta-stating process which Richard Bandler and John Grinder missed. Now Andreas quotes it and comments:

“Since they are already attending to their feelings, this is a good match for their experience, it asks them to categorize [meta-state] their feeling response at a more general logical level, instead of cycling back to their depressing thoughts, changing the loop. … Although occasionally a client might reply, ‘I feel depressed about being depressed,’ usually they will respond with a different feeling. ‘Well, I feel sad about feeling depressed.” . . . These new feelings will take them out of the old loop, and they can be utilized as a starting point for making future changes. If you get stuck, you can always ask the recursive feeling question again at any time. ‘How do you feel about feeling depressed about feeling depressed?” (II, p. 130)

Interesting enough, that is exactly what we have been doing in Meta-States for more than a decade. It offers an excellent way to gain control over a negative spiraling state. When we use this process in Meta-States, we acknowledge that it is the dynamic of multi-ordinality that Alfred Korzybski identified and described (Science and Sanity, 1933, pp. 440-1).

“Often people don’t enjoy learning to do something new, because the early stages of learning are often confusing and awkward, and they naturally would like to avoid this unpleasantness, and the unpleasant evaluative feelings about their confusion and awkwardness. It is one thing to realize that the beginning stages of learning are often inevitably difficult and uncomfortable. It is quite another to use that discomfort as a reason not to learn anything new.” (II, p. 131)

“Self-contradiction exists at the logical level of categorization, and at that level there truly is no solution. In order to escape from a contradiction, you have to shift logical levels. You can either go to a more general level, or to a more specific level.” (II, p. 150)

(“‘Feel free) to (restrict yourself) to the information that is relevant to the problem’ nests restriction inside freedom. … (‘Take as much time) as you need to (quickly review) those past events in order to come to a new conclusion about their relevance to your present life situation,’ gracefully nesting speed inside slowness.” (II, p. 157)

When George Bernard Shaw wrote, “I’m an atheist, and I thank God for it.” he put his identity (being an “atheist”) within the frame of “things to thank-God for.”

Andreas’ Basic Mistake
About self-reference Steve Andreas goes wrong from the beginning when he attempts to define self-reference. What he presents is not only simply wrong, but he forgets a back NLP principle and Meta-Model distinction, namely, The Lost Performative. His fallacious definition is this: “A category can be shown to include itself as a member.”

Now Andreas does admit that this goes against such intellectual giants as Bertrand Russell and Gregory Bateson. “I realize that this violates Bertrand Russell’s famous ‘Theory of Types.’” (II, p. 113). Yet even that doesn’t stop him. He wants to define self-reference as always involving a word or idea that “is both the categorizer and an example of the category” (II, p. 111).

“‘I respect you,’ is both a categorization of the relationship as respectful, and also an example of one of the behaviors described by the word ‘respect.’” (II, p. 111)

It is here that Andreas violated the Meta-Model distinction of Lost Performative. After all, who is doing the categorizing here? He says this “is both a categorization and … an example”—in other words, an identification. He writes as if it “is” that way and no human being is involved in making it so, which of course, is non-sense. He says “the sentence refers to itself.” Well, I’m sorry Steve, but sentences don’t do anything, a person uses a sentence to refer to things.

“When a statement refers to itself by including itself in a more general category of events, the statement must also be an absolute statement…” (II, pp. 114-115)

This is called the Lost Performative because someone is mapping out an understanding and the speaker has left out the performer of the map. Later he regains his sanity when he tells a story of a young woman and her mother. As he speaks about “how she categorizes,” he comments, “Her statement could have been a description that in her mind did not include itself.” (II, p. 171). Yes, of course! It is always a person who does the categorizing, the “sentence” is not the cause or source —the person is. Later Andreas writes something that he should equally apply to self-reference. If he had, he would not have made his error:

“Negation is either at a lower or higher logical level than existence, depending on how we think about it.” (II, p. 173, italics added)

To support this he declares that Bateson is also wrong (II, pp. 164,165). And once again he declares that “the statement categorizes.” “‘I love you’ categorizes the relationship at the same time that it is an example of the category of behaviors called ‘love.’” But that is not true. The truth is that it all depends on how we think about something. Do we include a category within the category? Or do we keep them separate? Here he creates confusion by making both category and member the same. The category of cats is not a cat, it is a category— a conceptual framework for talking about cats. And Steve knows this.

“… the name of the category is different from the group of experiences named…” (II, p. 113)

The problem is his invention of “heritability” which is the non-sense that he perpetuates.

“Whenever a category can be shown to include itself as a member, the criteria for the category apply not only to the members of the category, but also to the category itself, by the property of heritability. I realize this violates Bertrand Russell’s famous ‘Theory of Types.’” (II, p.113)

We see his lack of critical thinking when he thereafter declares this:

“If I say,’Ideas are insubstantial,’ that statement is also an idea, so it applies to itself, and is therefore insubstantial.”

But “that statement is an idea, so it applies to itself…” is his categorizing it as such. It does not have to be so categorize. I can treat the category, “Insubstantial ideas” as different from the ideas that I put into that category. “Insubstantial ideas” is a name. This is where Andreas goes wrong. Human beings are the persons who are doing the referring and categorizing. We can’t blame the sentences! That’s why we have to ask the person, “Are you making a distinction between class and member of the class? Are you applying the classification as a member of itself?”

If a person is doing that, then that statement from that person is self-referential and then many of the things Andreas writes about applies. But it is not the case that it always is that way. “I always say stupid things.” Ask, is that a stupid thing that you have said? “I never learn anything!” How did you learn that? Yes, self-reference statements do create paradox and when they do, two logical levels are confused: class and member of class. That’s the whole point from Russell and Bateson.

Conclusion
In the books Blind Elephants, Steve Andreas has renamed basic NLP realities using “scope” and “category.” From there he has offered new insights on various subjective experiences— much of it highly valuable and practical. For that I acknowledge Steve and his many contributions. Yet because Andreas has apparently not read extensively in the field of NLP, and doesn’t seem willing to know study the models I’ve introduced, specifically the Meta-States Model, he does not seem to know that his term and use of “category” corresponds with a meta-state, that is, a meta-level experience. In criticizing Robert Dilts and myself about logical levels, and mis-representing what both of us have said and written, he fights a Straw Man, does a wonderful job of devastating the Straw Man, but of course, doesn’t even address the real issue.

In Blind Elephants there are meta-states and meta-stating processes everywhere. But don’t ask Steve Andreas about that, he seems oblivious to that fact. I have attempted to point that out in these two articles. My wish and hope is that Steve will re-consider his position, read with an open mind, and not read to confirm his current beliefs.

Author:

L. Michael Hall, Ph.D., psychologist, author, and modeler with over 25 modeling projects, founder of Neuro-Semantics, developer of the Meta-States Model, and other models and patterns in NLP.

References:

Andreas, Steve. (2006). Six Blind Elephants, Volume I, Fundamental principles of scope and category. Moab, UT: Real People Press.

Hall, L. Michael. (2000). Meta-States: Managing the Higher Levels of Your Mind’s Reflexivity. Clifton, CO: Neuro-Semantic Publications.

Hall, Michael. (2001). NLP: Going Meta—Advance Modeling Using Meta-Levels. Clifton, CO: Neuro-Semantic Publications.

Hall, L. Michael; Bodenhamer, Bob G. (2005). Sub-Modalities: Going Meta. Formerly, “The Structure of Excellence.” Clifton, CO: Neuro-Semantic Publications.

Hall, L. Michael. (2000). Secrets of personal mastery: Advanced techniques for accessing your higher levels of consciousness. Wales, UK: Crown House Publications.

L. Michael Hall, Ph.D.

During the past year I engaged in an extended discussion with Steve Andreas about the term meta. You can read that discussion on either the Neuro-Semantic website or Andreas’ website. It’s all there for your pursual. You will probably noticed that in the discussion, we both seemed to talk past each other and as a result we did not come to a meeting of minds. And while I pretty much anticipated that, I really do not understand why we could not get on the same page. Steve claims that I did not answer his questions. In my view, I fully answered his questions. I feel that he did not really seek to understand the multiple meanings that are entailed in the term meta.

In reflecting on this, I suspect that a possible reason is that some people simply do not see the wonder and the “magic” of meta is that they do not recognize that the term meta is both a multi-ordinal term and a systems term that requires the acceptance of numerous system principles.

To explain this, I will first describe multi-ordinality and then the “magic” of meta within a system and as a systems dynamic. That will then allow me to specify how linearly thinking is the problem in preventing a person from seeing the richness of the term meta.

Multi-Ordinality
Alfred Korzybski describe terms that have an overgeneralized meaning and whose meaning changes according to its level. He termed these infinite-valued terms multi-ordinal. This means that at all of its levels (“multi-”) the term is reflexive—it can be used on itself. You can fear fear. You can love love. Linguists say that such terms are polysemous, that is, “marked by multiplicity of meanings.” Korzybski writes (Science and Sanity, 1933/ 1994):

“‘Mankind, science, mathematics, man, education, ethics, politics, religion, sanity, insanity, iron, wood, apple, object, etc.’ We use them not as one-valued terms for constants of some sort, but as terms with inherently infinite-valued or variable referents.” (pp. 138–9, 433)

Korzybski argued that his Theory of Multi-Ordinality and Reflexivity solved the problems created when we confuse map and territory. They fail to distinguish the levels of abstraction (logical levels). For this reason I added multi-ordinality to the extended Meta- Model (Communication Magic, 2001).

“A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness. … If we reflect upon our languages, we find that at best they must be considered only as maps. A word is not the object it represents; and languages exhibit also this peculiar self-reflexiveness, that we can analyse languages by linguistic means. This self-reflexiveness of languages introduces serious complexities, which can only be solved by the theory of multi-ordinality. The disregard of these complexities is tragically disastrous in daily life and science.” (p. 58, italics added)

The term meta has multiple meanings precisely because it is a multi-ordinal term. Can you go meta (step back to a higher perspective) to the process of meta (stepping back)? Yes, of course and you can do that level upon level. Yet if you are using linear thinking to understand this, you will not and cannot understand this. Korzybski stated that the “Theory of Multi-Ordinality” (i.e., General Semantics) addresses map/territory confusion. The linguistic distinction of multi-ordinality explains why any word used multi-ordinally means something different at every level. And that’s why we have to ask, “At what level are you using that term?”

Multi-ordinality means that the term takes on a different meaning at each ordinal level (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.). That’s why we have to ask, “At what level are you using the term?” So fear at the first level refers to something “out there” in the territory that is dangerous. But can you fear your state of fear? What is fear2 of fear1? We could say that the second-level of fear (fear2) is paranoia. Could you fear3 your fear-of-fear?1

The term meta at the first level simply means “above, beyond, or about.” Context then determines what is put at a higher level to the first level. You can have an emotion about an emotion; a thought about a thought. When you talk about the way you talk, your language is meta-language. When you use a metaphor to make a comparison, you are meta-stating with that metaphor. A metaphor is literally meta and phorein (to bring, to carry over). As you create a metaphor, you bring one image, thought, idea, reference, etc. to another so that it becomes the frame which formats a structure for the first. When you do this, you think about one thing in terms of another. Andreas uses the word “scope” for the primary level and “category” for the meta-level (Six Blind Elephants, I, p. 26)

The Strangeness of Systems “Magic”
When you put one state in a meta-relationship to another, you are likely to create which seems like magic. This “magic” is not literal, it rather describes an effect— how meta-relationship can strike us as magical because the result is often surprising, unexpected, and amazing. Here is the meta-stating process whereby one element interacts with another element and out of the mixture, something new and different and unexpected arises. Since a gestalt refers to something that is more than and different from the sum of the parts, multiple meta-stating gives rise to gestalt states.

What this means is that if you add up all of the parts, elements, or components together, you cannot explain the resulting experience. What we call “learning” becomes a very different experience when you bring joy to learning. “Joyful learning”— here the quality of the learning changed, but the experience itself hardly seems like learning at all. It seems like fun. People in the meta-state of joyful learning seem to be very happy and passionate. Looking at them and evaluating what they are experiencing, you could say all sort sof things such as—they are “in the zone,” they are in a state of pleasure, they are just enjoying themselves, etc. Yes, you could also put “joyful learning” as one member of the class of “learning” as Steve does. Yet that does not deny or prevent “learning” within the category of “joy.”

This is the way it is with systems. In systems, when various components interact with other components, new emergent properties arise that cannot be explained by adding the elements together. A new quality arises. Bring respect, calmness, and kindness to your primary state of anger— “I’m angry because you snub me and didn’t give me a referral” and you have a very different experience. Calm respectfully kind anger is hardly felt or experienced as “anger” at all by the one receiving it. The person giving it is firm but the calmness and kindness gives it an unique quality as the respect tempers the person’s words and confrontation so that it is quite acceptable. It doesn’t seem like anger, it seems that the person is simply being direct and open. Andreas’ mindset seems to make the “anger” category his primary referent than “going meta” to that category.

Consider the person who has forbidden himself from feeling anger because he considers that it means being “out-of-control.” Here we have multiple levels. (Believing anger means out-of-control) (I forbid myself) from (experiencing anger). So when anger is experienced, because it is forbidden, that taboo could create one of several different gestalts— inability to recognize anger, blindness to one’s anger, anger transmuting into stress (or frustration or fear or some other emotion). If you calibrate to that person’s state, would you even recognize that he is angry? Maybe not.

Consider the person who hates selling because to him it means “taking advantage of people for monetary gain.” What is the primary state? Presenting a product. Suppose it is the state of wanting to present or offer a product, a product he believes “is good value for money,” and “useful.” But the belief frame “selling takes advantage of people,” which the person hates, now holds him back. What is the feeling? The person feels stuck. The person feels conflicted inside. “I know it is a good product, but I don’t want to be aggressive or controlling.” The gestalt state here is being stuck. This emerges from the inter-relationship between the thinking-feeling components in the person’s mind. Yes, “hating selling” can be treated as a member of the class of anger (Andreas’ position). We can also see “selling” in the higher category of “hate” (my position). It is not an either/or choice. Both are legitimate.

In Neuro-Semantics, we talk about this layering of multiple elements (the meta-stating process) as texturing the state’s quality. How do you want your learning state textured? How do you want your loving state textured? If the quality of your life depends on the quality of your state, then the quality of your state depends on the quality of your meta-state. The state that you put at a meta level to your first state — qualifies it, textures it, and sets up the “magic” of the emergence of new properties. This is the point that Andreas has not (or will not) concede.

Consider the primary state of acting sequentially in a step-by-step way (the procedure meta-program). Let’s call that—being “disciplined” because the person is following a procedure. Now ask, “What do you think and/or feel about being disciplined?” (i.e., acting sequentially). Imagine that a person says, “I think that I’m losing my spontaneity and that I have no freedom.” That now becomes the higher category. What will be the effect of that belief (a category and meta level state) about the primary state? Probably stuck and unable to act. “I can’t do that.” If we again ask for an explanation, she might say, “without freedom I have less opportunities and won’t grow, I’ll be dying inside.”

This is another example of tabooing a primary state. The person stops herself from “acting sequentially, one step after another” because at the meta level category she attributes the meaning of having no spontaneity, choice, freedom, growth, etc. The meaning at these meta-levels over-loads the primary state (the scope) and shuts the person down.

“Magic,” in the sense of something being surprising, unexpected, and amazing, arises from the emergent properties (qualities) when we bring one or more thoughts or feelings to another. It is the interplay of these elements that systemically give rise to experiences that can’t be explain by mere addition.

When a gestalt occurs from combining multiple elements what happens is that we cannot anticipate the results. Add commitment to a goal, responsibility and passion to the primary state of fear and out of the mixture will sometimes come “courage.” Courage, as the gestalt of those components, is something “more than” and “different from” adding those elements together. A reductionistic analysis of “courage” will not find those pieces or how they intermingle. This is the “magic” (the wonder and surprise) of creating a gestalt of multiple meta-level components.

Consider making a mistake. At the primary level, this is something we all do on a daily basis. But “making a mistake” does not stand alone. You think and feel something about it. But what? What category do you put it in? Do you (fear) (making a mistake)? Do you (judge yourself as a person) for (making a mistake)? Those are different states/ categories. And they are radically from (learning) from (making a mistake). What if you bring (appreciation) (learning) (wondrous curiosity) and (playfulness) to (making a mistake)? What gestalt experience would that generate?

Part of the “magic” of meta-stating various resourceful elements to a primary state consists of the surprise and wonder of the emergent properties and their qualities. What if you were (fascinated) and (joyful) about (embarrassment)? You might experience something like the outrageous physical humor that Jim Carey is known for. What if you had (gracious) and (playful) (persistence)?

All of this suggests a process that we use with the Meta-States Model. We write various “states” on pieces of paper and then pick up 4 or 5 of them and try them on in our imagination. What would (outrageous) (optimism) and (passion) along with (joyful exaggeration) do for a trainer? Could that turn out a Anthony Robbins?

Take any primary state experience — whether you focus on behavior, emotion, or thought— and then playfully layer on top of it various resourceful states and consider what could arise as an emergent property.

• (Accepting) (loving) (gentle) compassion.
• (Relaxed) (dedicated) (persistent) engagement.
• (Thoughtful) (calmness) (proactive) decision-making.

When you “go meta” to the next higher level and layer on yet another state of thinking-feeling, you then put a twist on the primary experience because you are putting it into a higher category. It textures that experience. It adds another quality to it. The mixture of multiple resources sets up a systemic complexity that operates as a catalyst for a new and unpredictable emergent property.

When you “go meta” you are doing what Ken Wilbur described as “transcending and including.” It is not either you are transcending or you are including, you are doing both simultaneously. Yes you transcend from the primary level to a meta-level and you are including that primary experience inside of a new meta-level that becomes its frame. This generates all sorts of new possibilities.

The Problem is Linear Thinking
If meta is a multi-ordinal and systems term, then what stops full appreciation of it is linear thinking. And surprisingly this is a very common problem for many in the field of NLP. This, in spite of the fact that there were many system influences in the founding of NLP (Satir Family Systems, Perls Gestalt, Korzybski’s General Semantics as a non-Aristotelian system, Bateson’s cybernetic systems, etc.).

When you have have a complex adaptive system that involves large number of parts (elements, components) and which interact with each other, then you have a kaleidoscopic array of simultaneous non-linear interactions. Given this, the sum is not a simple sum of the behavior of the parts. And why? Because as the elements interact and as the aggregate behavior of the whole occurs, all of these are fed back to the individual components. What in linear thinking is viewed as the effect then becomes the next level cause. And around and around it goes.

The key then lies in the interfaces that occur when one meta-level or phenomenon interacts with another. The following comes from Meta-States (2012) and is included in the training manual.

1) Reduce painful primary states: Calm about anger.
2) Intensify or magnify primary states: Worry about worry, anxious about anxiety.
3) Exaggerate and distort states: turn psychological energies against oneself: fear of anger: anger at one’s fear.
4) Negate or neutralize a state: In doubt about doubt, I feel more sure.
5) Interrupt states: Humorous about serious, intentionally panicking.
6) Confuse States: Ridiculous about serious.
7) Contradict levels to create paradox: hence “paradoxical intention,” the “be spontaneous now” paradox. Try really hard to relax, “never say never”
8) Dissociate from strong feelings: observing a remembered trauma.
9) Seed a new process to create response potential: courage to have courage, playful uncertainty.
10) Grab Attention: appreciative about anger, lovingly gentle about anger.
11) Entrance or hypnotize: Rebel against thinking about just how comfortable you can feel if you don’t close your eyes before you’re ready to relax deeper than you ever have before, now. I wonder if you’re going to fail to succeed at not going into trance at exactly your own speed or whether you won’t.
12) Generate gestalt states: Suppress excitement—>anxiety.
13) Jar consciousness for humor: An accomplished liar, flexible compulsiveness.
14) Qualify, temper, texture an experiences: Joyful learning, ruthless compassion.
15) Solidify a atate: Believe or value in X, take pride in X.
16) Loosen states: Doubt X, question X, be playful about X.

Summary
The meta process is a very dynamic one. Further, if used in an open system, then it never reaches an end-point, it never achieves its goals and “arrives,” it keep evolving, growing, and developing— becomes increasingly complex. This is why many do not see the dynamic nature of meta and why it takes on new properties and meanings at different levels.

• At the primary level, meta just means “above, beyond, or about.”
• Meta then establishes a relationships that is hierarchical as it establishes levels.
• As meta is used in relationship to something else, it takes on the meaning of “including and transcending
• ” which speaks of a system of inter-related components.
• As a system and systemic in nature, meta enables various emergent properties to emerge that cannot be explained by adding them together. It is non-linear, non-additive.

Do I use the term meta in several different ways as Steve Andreas suggests? Yes I do! That’s because the term is multi-ordinal and systemic. That’s also why and how the Meta-States Model can help us model complex, long-term system experiences.

Post Script
Interesting enough, Steve Andreas, quoting his wife Connirae’s work in Core Transformation, actually describes how the meta-stating process works. He uses the word “category” where I use “meta-state.” After starting with a primary level limitation, you ask—

“‘Having this outcome (X), what do you want, through having X, that’s even more important?’ This question is asked repeatedly, each time substituting the previous outcome, creating a series of outcomes in a hierarchy of importance. Each successive outcome is a more general category of experience, with increasingly larger scope and importance.” (2006, Vol. I, p. 89)

Then he says, “the description usually falls into one of several categories: ‘being,’ ‘inner peace,’ ‘love,’ ‘Okness,’ or ‘oneness.’” These vague terms are meta-states and/or meta-level understandings or beliefs.

References:
Polysemy refers to a word which has many different meanings. Mentioned in Six Blind Elephants, I, p. 59.

Review of Steve Andreas’s
Ongoing Misunderstandings of Meta-States

L. Michael Hall, Ph.D.
Written 2006, updated 2018

At least he’s honest! I have to give him that. In his new book on Fundamental Principles of Scope and Category that he titled, Six Blind Elephants, Steve Andreas at least acknowledges that he just does not understand the Meta-States Model. Of course, he makes that admission as he is criticizing and arguing against it!

“I admit to being dizzy and confused. What on earth could it mean…?” Steve Andreas (Six Blind Elephants, 2006, p. 116)

His Straw Man Fallacy Argument
At first, I hoped he would provide a solid critique wherein he might point out some weakness or some area that needs more refinement. But no. What he argued against, and critiqued, was only a “straw man” presentation of the Meta-States Model. So I felt disappointed in his criticism. It reads more like Don Juan fighting vigorously against the windmills because he imagined that they were knights. Against the straw man that he created I could have given him even more arguments. I would have equally disputed what he argued against as unworthy and inadequate.

Andreas says that neither I nor Robert Dilts will “provide a clear operational definition of how we determine logical levels.” That’s not exactly true. I have repeatedly sent him that information and, for that matter, he could find that on the Neuro-Semantic website if he so chose. There’s plenty of articles there, free articles, about Meta-States and Logical Levels. As far as I can tell, he has not even read Meta-States, Secrets of Personal Mastery, Dragon Slaying, Frame Games, or Meta-State Magic to understand the Meta-States Model. The one and only book he even references in his bibliography is the first edition of The Matrix Model. So, given that, I’ll give him a break that what he has written is just the lack of study and information about Meta-States. Yet isn’t that funny that he wrote his review before he did his research? Not exactly professional.

In his book he quotes me, “Meta-States necessitates a different kind of thinking” than linear thinking. But then he tries to put the Meta-States Model on a procrustean bed to fit the linear thinking of his ideas of category and scope. It makes for an interesting, yet very inadequate critique. Generally, when scholars offer a critique, they will put that which they critique in context and evaluate it on its own merits and up against the contexts in which it has been designed. Andreas did not do this.

What Steve Andreas doesn’t seem to understand is that when it comes to human thinking-and-feeling as a dynamic, non-linear system, we do not follow the rules of Socrates and Aristotle’s rules of logic as we create our mental categories. Instead, as Alfred Korzybski noted, we are not logical, but psycho-logical beings. When it comes to the way we categorize things (since Andreas’ book is about categories and categorization (most of which is a pretty good description of how meta-states work), in human experiencing and meaning-making through thinking-and-feeling, we can categorize just about anything as a member of any category.

Playfully Serious
Andreas quotes me about “playful seriousness” and “playfully and compassionately kind in our seriousness,” but then he declares (as if this is absolute and divine truth) that playful as the modifier is a sub-category of seriousness (2006, p. 115). Really!

Yet is it that? That’s the question. What if we thought about the state and quality of being serious (which Steve seems to be well practiced in) and brought some playfulness to it? What if we brought some kind compassion to it? What if we brought some win/win thinking to it? Those are the qualities I typically frame (or meta-state) seriousness. I know it’s not logical, but what if we did it anyway? What if we did that just for the fun of it?

Steve does not even consider this possibility. He seems to only have one direction for sending his brain and that is in the direction of smaller and smaller categories. So for him, “playful” is a sub-category. And yes a person can perceive it that way. Yet there are other ways to perceive it. That is not the only choice for how to perceive it or frame it.

If we applied playful to serious we would embed serious inside of the larger context of play. That would make “seriousness” a member of the category of playfulness. Yes, I know, it is completely psycho-logical. Doing this would reduce the scope (extent) of seriousness making it a smaller thing to playfulness (which would be the larger category). Simultaneously it would extend the scope of playfulness, making playful the bigger thing.

Blinded by the Flawed Sub-Modality Model
Reading Blind Elephants makes me think that Steve has been completely blinded by the old sub-modality model. (Actually there’s a number of NLP people blinded by it.) The old so-called “sub-modality” model thought that because sub is in the title of sub-modalities that the features and variables that are called “sub” are “smaller”and “finer” distinctions. Description has been treated as territory. If we use that name, they must be below and sub- to the basic representation systems.

My hallucination is that he has taken the size or scope of things (smaller to bigger) to be equivalent to the construct of any and every “logical level.” And if that’s what has blinded the elephant, then no wonder he cannot understand Meta-States! This could be his chemistry background getting in his way. Steve Andreas has “atoms” and “molecules” on his mind and so sees things via the chemistry model. [“If we think of a scope as an ‘atom’ of meaning, a category is a simple ‘molecule’ composed of a group of scopes.” I, p. 237.]

On the Disliking of Words
Andreas also does not like lots of words. He states that “state” is “an ambiguous term” (I, p. 203). He does not like “reframing” and he seems to especially not like “meta” (and meta-position) because he thinks it is too vague. His solution? Get rid of these words!

“The easiest solution is to simply not use these terms at all.” (I, p. 154)

That’s right. If you don’t understand something, if you don’t like the way someone else is using a term, kill it! Murder it in its sleep! Yes I guess that would be easier to than reading the books and articles on Meta-States. So what does Steve Andreas know about the Meta-States Model and/or the process of meta-stating? What he writes about it is pure fiction. It is certainly not what I have written about a meta-states, and I should know a bit about that.

“When someone applies one vague and general ‘state’ to another ‘state’ to create a ‘meta-state,’ that compounds the ambiguity and uncertainty about what is actually happening. If this ‘meta-state’ is further ‘meta-stated,’ the confusion deepens exponentially.” (I, p. 188)

Hmmmm. So I wonder if Steve meets someone who says he is afraid of his fear (or anger, excitement, confidence, etc.), if instead of dealing with the fear of some other state, he will first make the fear of that other state more clear and precise? Of course, that generally will increase and amplify the fear and so set a more intense frame of fear about the first state and make things much worse for the person.

Interesting enough, on the next page in the book (I, p. 189), he writes, “What is important is the quality or appropriateness of the resource state to the problem” Hmmm. If he had read what I wrote, he would have recognized that as the process of meta-stating. Bringing a vague and general “resource state” of quality or appropriateness to the problem state? That is precisely what we do in Meta-States.

This is the elephant’s blindness (Steve’s), he is meta-stating and does not even know it!
“‘Meta-stating’ applies one poorly defined state to another, compounding the ambiguity and confusion in the term ‘state.’” (I, p. 203)

Yes, Steve, I would also complain and criticize if that’s what I meant by meta-stating or what I presented anywhere about meta-stating. Thank God it is not. In fact, in Meta-State trainings (Accessing Personal Genius, APG) I focus entirely on accessing very precise states (not poorly defined ones) to very precise contexts and situations in order to create richer and more robust states like resilience, self-esteem, ownership of one’s response-powers, the “flow” state of mastery and scores more.

Categorizing — also Known as Meta-Stating
The kind of categorizing we do in meta-stating creates new and more effective frames of mind, frames of reference, frames of meaning for a new psycho-logics. Obviously doing so does not fit Andrea’s definitions of category and scope, and involves our psycho-logics which given what he wrote, he does not like. Given I had hoped he would have taken some time to do some research on the Meta-States Model, and he did not, I here announce an open invitation to Steve Andreas—you can attend any Accessing Personal Genius training that I do anywhere in the world at no cost.

[By the way, I still have a standing invitation also to John Grinder given that he also has written that he does not understand “the proliferation of meta-states.”]

Paradoxically, Steve uses the meta-stating process throughout his entire book and doesn’t seem to know it. In his Introduction he writes,

“If someone says to you, ‘That’s an interesting way to do that,’ and you categorize [meta-state] that statement as a ‘criticism,’ you will tend to feel bad, and then think of other unpleasant experiences in that category, and feel even worse. But if you categorize [meta-state] that statement as a ‘compliment,’ you will feel pleased, and then tend to think of it in the context of other compliments, and feel even more pleased.” (I, p. x)

Actually, meta-stating involves setting a context about some other experience. You can meta-state a statement as meaning either criticism or compliment. You can bring the state of criticism or compliment to your first state of receiving those words. In doing so, you frame it, set a context, and create a meaning. Steve calls this a category and categorizing. I call it a meta-state and meta-stating. Strange that he has to misrepresent my model and put it down as he attempts to put forward his model —in critical thinking, we call that the Straw Man Fallacy.

In Meta-State Trainings, a Neuro-Semantic Trainer will talk about the power of a simple adjective to qualify one state with another state. That’s why “joyful learning” is a meta-state, so is playful seriousness, etc. Steve writes this:

“Soon after learning about cognitive qualifiers, I had a depressed client who began almost every sentence with ‘sadly,’ or ‘regrettably.’ [Say Steve, aren’t these vague and poorly defined terms?] As a first step, I asked him to start every sentence with ‘happily’ or ‘fortunately.’ This felt very strange and inappropriate to him, but it stabilized him to the powerful impact that his words had on him, and it began to restore some balance.” (I, p. 271)

To explain how the higher frame governs the lower, Andreas invents a word, “inheritability” (I, p. 267). Well, of course. You meta-stated him with new modifying states —happiness and fortune. This means that it is possible to be using the structure of meta-states and not even know it. Come to think of it, the “strange and inappropriate” feelings that the client experienced was probably that his mind had been invited to create some new psycho-logics and went around in a few loops and got dizzy from the strangeness of that experience.

Since Andreas doesn’t know this, when we apply one state to another and create a meta-relationship so that the second state stands at a higher position to the first, it sets a frame, it establishes the mental context, a category, and it thereby generates a construct of meaning. To use his words, it sets a new category, it re-categorizes, it expands scope, it contracts scope, and it can even nest categories so that they overlap. All of that is fully entailed in the Meta-States Model.

Andreas recommends asking, “What kind of X would you like?” (i.e., general, divorce, etc. p. 264) to match the current category and nest yet another one inside it. In Meta-States, we ask, “What is the quality of your X?” “What is the quality of your anger? Your grief? Your confidence? Your learning? Does it have the kind and quality that you want?” On second thought, maybe he has been reading Meta-States and is just using my materials with his new term “category.” Is that what you’ve been doing Steve? No? I didn’t think so.

He uses this book to present the NLP reframing models (and gives no indication that he has ever even read or researched Mind-Lines, 1997/2005). There he presents frame (context and category are his words) after frame as a higher frame— same as out-framing in Mind-Lines, the meta-stating of our frames with yet higher frames. He also uses many of the NLP presuppositions as frames that one could use.

In addition to still being under the illusion that the cinematic features by which we can edit our internal movies are “sub”-modalities and at a lower logical level, Andreas is also tricked and blinded by imposing the idea of “control” upon hierarchies. He argues for a “heterarchy” because the meta-program of preference (people, things, time, activities, location, and information) is not a hierarchy of control or importance (210ff). This is convoluted reasoning. After all, who has ever said that the meta-program of preferences is a control hierarchy so that those items that are most important govern those that are less? I have not (e.g., Figuring Out People, 1997/2007), and I don’t know anyone who has. This seems to be another straw man argument that Andreas then effectively demolishes. He did a good job except that he wasted his time on something that I also don’t agree with!

When Steve quoted me describing the non-linear nature of meta-stating, the nature of human reflexivity which sends our brains round and round, turning it over, upside down and at first generating confusion and dizziness, he wrote,

“Many years ago, someone said, ‘All writing is either biography or autobiography.” In this case, I think it is definitely autobiography.”

While I’m sure it applies to me, it surely applies to him as well. I wonder if he is really dizzy and confused or if he just does not want to understand the Meta-States Model in the first place?

Summary
If you want to understand the Meta-States Model which models the workings and processes of our self-reflexive consciousness, do not depend on Steve Andreas to accurately describe it. He does not. Actually, he doesn’t have a clue about what it is or how it works. Yet on the other hand, he actually describes the meta-stating process when he talks about establishing a new and higher category.”